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EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES s A LIFE AND DEATH ISSUE 6 ^  
G. FELTOE*
1. INTRODUCTION
In Zimbabwe the death penalty is a mandatory sentence for murder where 
there are no extenuating circumstances. * (The only exceptions are 
that the death penalty may not be imposed upon a pregnant woman or a 
person under the age of sixteen and the court has a discretion to 
impose a lesser sentence than death upon a mother who has - killed her 
newly born child.) The trial court is obliged to sentence to death in 
the absence of extenuating circumstances. ;0n. the other hand if it 
finds that there are extenuating circumstances the court has the 
discretion to Impose a sentence other than death. Thus, even if the 
court finds that there were extenuating circumstances, it could still 
proceed to. Impose the death sentence If, for instance, It concluded 
that the extenuating circumstances were -not strong and were far 
outweighed by the aggravating features. ^ •
The matter of extenuating circumstances is quite literally a life 
and death issue. Yet the decision as to whether there are sufficient 
extenuating circumstances to justify the non-imposition of the death 
penalty is often a very difficult one. Some cases, of course, are 
quite clear cut, there are some where it is patently obvious that 
there are absolutely no extenuating circumstances and there are some 
where the existence of cogent extenuation such as to make the death 
penalty Inappropriate Is beyond doubt. Frequently, however, decisions 
about extenuation are far less clear cut a it may be highly debatable 
on the evidence as a whole whether the scales are tipped in favour :of 
or against the death penalty. In such cases there is scope for 
disagreement on the matter of extenuation. That these cases do 
attract differing opinions about extenuation is clearly evidenced by
* Senior Lecturer In Law, University of Zimbabwe.
1. See s. 314 (1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chap.
59.
2. See, for example Phineas v S 1973 (3) SA 877 (RA): S. 314 (1) of 
Chap. 59 lays down that the court' may (not must) Impose a 
sentence other than death If It is of the opinion that there are 
extenuating circumstances. It follows, therefore, that it can 
still pass the death penalty even if it finds extenuation. See 
Hunt (1971) South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. 2 (2nd 
Ed.) p. 388 and 88 SALJ 416. (In the last mentioned article the 
author argues that the court should be obliged to impose the 
death penalty where It finds extenuation).
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the number of cases In which the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
trial court was wrong In concluding that there was Insufficient 
extenuation to reduce the sentence from death. This article seeks to 
explore particularly the decision-making process in these more finely 
balanced cases and to highlight the dangers Involved in making such a 
vital matter as extenuation depend upon the exercise of subjective 
moral judgment based on rather nebulous factors. It also attempts to 
provide a commentary on the leading Zimbabwean cases on extenuation.
2. WHAT ARE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES7
There have been many attempted definitions of this elusive concept. 
Perhaps the clearest is that of Holmes J.A in S v Letsolo 3 namely 
'Extenuating circumstances are facts, bearing on the commission of the 
crime, which reduce the moral blameworthiness of the accused, as 
distinct from his legal culpability". Two aspects of this definition 
need to be stressed. Firstly, the facts or circumstances must be 
directly related to or connected with the criminal conduct. The court 
is only concerned with facts which lessen the seriousness or 
culpability of that particular criminal conduct. Secondly, 
extenuation relates to moral blameworthiness. At the stage when 
extenuation is being considered, the accused has already been found 
guilty of murder. Any full or partial defence which he may have, 
raised before conviction will thus not have succeeded, otherwise he 
would have been found not guilty or guilty of the lesser crime of 
culpable homicide. Facts raised in respect of the failed defence are 
nonetheless relevant when extenuation is under consideration because 
they may have a bearing on the moral blameworthiness of the accused. 
If, foe instance, the accused was provoked to some extent, even though 
he was not so’provoked that he lacked the intention to kill, this must 
be taken into account in deciding upon extenuation. Or if the accused 
took unreasonable and unnecessary action to ward off an attack and 
thus the defence of self-defence has failed because it has not met all 
of the essential . requirements for the defence, the fact that 'the 
accused was under some form of attack still must be considered at the 
extenuation stage. Or the accused may have been under some compulsion 
but not of a sufficient degree to satisfy the requirements of the 
defence of compulsion: This factor must still be properly considered 
at the stage of extenuation.
It should also be stressed that the facts vary from case to case 
and the matter of . extenuation has to be considered with reference to 
the facts of the particular case in question. A factor may be 
extenuating in the context of one case but may not necessarily be 
extenuating when considered in the context of the facts of a 
completely different case. Or a factor which is strongly extenuating 
on the facts of a particular case may only be very weakly extenuating 
on the facts of a different case. It should be noted also that it is 
the cumulative effective of all possible extenuating factors in the 
particular case which must be considered by the court and the court 3
3. See Muchlmlka v S(2) 1970 (3) SA 476 (A) at 476. Unreported
S-93-87 p. 2 of cyclostyled judgment.
vsvv
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"misdirects itself if it considers and dismisses each factor in
isolation”.  ^ The correct approach is thus to isolate all 
extenuating factors, no matter how weak each individually may be, and . 
to weigh these cumulatively.
3. KEEP FOR CAREFUL COMSIDEBATXOH OF EXTEMPATIOH AMD THE GIVING OF
FULL REASONS FOR DECISION OH EXTEBTOATIOH
As has been said previously, the finding, oh extenuation is of crucial
importance. As a person's life is at stake, there can be no room
whatsoever for superficial treatment when the courts are dealing with 
this issue. It is essential that the trial court examines the matter 
of extenuating circumstances in painstaking detail and that it 
articulates fully its reasons for its decision for its finding.
Unfortunately trial courts have not invariably dealt with extenuation
as thoroughly as they should. In a number of recent cases the Supreme
Court has drawn attention to the fact that it is imperative that full 
reasons for its decision on extenuation be given by the trial court so 
that the Appeal Court is in a position to assess the validity of these 
reasons. . The insistence by the Supreme Court on the giving of full 
reasons for decisions on extenuation will lead to salutary results. 
The giving of full reasons necessitates the detailed exploration of 
all relevant considerations and avoids shallow treatment of this vital 
matter. Obviously convincing reasons can only be given for a decision 
if the facts are considered in detail and then a considered decision
about these facts is arrived at. A further reason why trial courts
should be obliged to deal with the matter of extenuation with great 
care, is that when, as usually happens, the case goes on appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the Appeal Court has only a limited capacity to 
interfere with the trial court's discretionary finding on extenuation.
In Mateketa v S ^ for instance the Chief Justice stated at p.9 
of the judgment that "the omission to give reasons is an irregularity" 
which allows the Supreme Court the right to interfere with the trial 
court’s discretionary finding on extenuation. As no reasons were 
given, said the Chief Justice, the Appeal Court was entitled to 
examine the record to find out whether there were any extenuating 
circumstances.
4. TWO METHODS OF DE&LIKC WITH THE DEATH PEMALT? ISSUE
In Zimbabwe over the years two different approaches have emerged as to 
how to deal with the matter of extenuation. ® In theory the same end 
result should be arrived at whichever of these two approaches is 
employed. The first method may be described as the single stage or 
composite method and the second as the two stage method. 456
4. S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 571.
5. Unreported S-99-85.
6. In a number of cases the Appeal Court has stated that either of 
the two approaches are permissible. See, L for example, S v 
Phlneas, 1973 (3) SA 897 (RA); 1973 (1) RLR 260, S v Jacob 1981 
ZLR1 1(A). The two stage approach was adopted in Mudzlmu v S. 
Unreported S-965-82 and Moyo v S unreported S-186-82.
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A. THE SINGLE STAGE OR COMPOSITION METHODS
Basically this entails weighing all mitigating factors against all 
aggravating factors in order to make a finding as to whether on 
balance extenuating circumstances exist such as to justify the 
non-imposition of the death penalty. Thus under this approach it is 
possible for the trial court to conclude that despite the existence of 
mitigating features there is no extenuation because those mitigating 
factors are outweighed by the aggravating features. If extenuating 
circumstances are found to exist presumably the court will impose a 
sentence less than death as it has already given consideration to the 
matter of aggravation in deciding whether there were extenuating 
circumstances.
B. THE TWO STAGE METHOD
STAGE 1 v
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The trial court seeks to identify whether there are any extenuating 
factors, no matter how weak these may bet At this stage the court 
disregards all aggravating features.
STAGE 2
The court now seeks to identify any aggravating features. Having done 
this it weighs the aggravating features against the extenuating 
factors and decides whether, on balance, the death penalty should be 
Imposed. It could thus conclude, that'despite the existence of some 
extenuating factors the death penalty should nonetheless still be
imposed because, for instance, the extenuating factors are weak and 
the aggravating features are very strong.
Although both of these approaches entail a consideration of the 
same sorts of material, it is the second approach has these 
advantages ^ s
(1) In terms of s. 314 of Chap. 59 the court may (not must) Impose a 
sentence other than death if it decides that there are
extenuating circumstances. The first approach seems to be at 
variance with the wording of this section insofar as the court 
simply decides whether or not extenuating circumstances exist 
and, presumably, if it decides that there are no such
circumstances it will automatically impose the death penalty. 
On the other hand, the second approach enables the court' to
decide, as the section specifies, whether, despite the
extenuating factors, the death penalty is still nevertheless to 
be Imposed.
(ii) More importantly, the second approach necessitates a careful
stage by stage examination of the factors. The first approach 
can lead to a more superficial treatment of extenuation in that 
if all the aggravating and mitigating factors are considered 
together, the trial court may not properly separate out all of 
these various factors and meticulously decide upon the weight to *
7 It will be suggested later that there is a completely different 
approach to extenuation which could be adopted which might lead 
to a fairer and more consistent handling of extenuation.
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be attached to them. The second approach, on the other hand, 
obliges the court to articulate exactly what, If any,
extenuating features are present and then subsequently to pin 
down what aggravating features there are. It must then finally 
make a decision whether the aggravating features are
sufficiently strong to justify the step of imposing the death 
sentence, even though there were some extenuating circumstances.
There has been no definitive decision in recent years in which 
the Supreme Court has expressed a direct opinion as to which of these 
two approaches it favours. However, it is implicit in a number of 
recent supreme court cases that the Supreme Court now favours the 
single stage method. ®
5. PEBSBW SAFBSOMDS AFTER TO DBATH PENALTY HAS,BEEN IMPOSED BY 
TRIM. COURT
A. APPEALS TO SUPREME COPRT
There is virtually an automatic right of appeal against a death 
sentence to the Supreme Court. ® (There is no system of automatic 
review of all death sentences by the Supreme Court.) However, despite 
the fact that almost all death penalty verdicts are subjected to 
scrutiny by the Supreme Court on appeal, the capacity of the Supreme 
Court to interfere with death sentences is limited. The matter of 
sentence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court Judge. 
Therefore the Supreme Court can only set aside a death sentence passed 
by the trial court if:
(i) there was some irregularity or misdirection on the part of the 
trial judge or,
(ii) the finding that there were no extenuating circumstances was one 
which no reasonable court could have arrived at or the death 
sentence was disturbingly inappropriate or manifestly excessive 
in the light of all the circumstances. 8910
8. The issue in these cases was whether, if extenuating
circumstances were found to exist, the death penalty could still 
be imposed on the basis that the manner of killing was such in 
terms of brutality that this factor overrode the extenuation. 
The Supreme Court emphatically laid down that if extenuating 
circumstances were found, the factor of the brutality of the 
killing could not be used in order to justify a decision to 
impose the death penalty despite the presence of extenuation. 
These decisions were Mateketa v S, S-99-85, Chaluwa v S S-75-85, 
Mutsunge & Anor S-36-87 and Muchlmika v S (No. 2) S-93-87.
9. See statement by McNally J A to this effect in Muchinika v S. 
Unreported S-121-85 at p. 1.
10. See Timothy v S. Unreported A-178-71 at p.; X v S. Unreported 
A-178-77 and Zvikaramba v S A-310-77.
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Because the appeal coutt has such a limited capacity to 
Interfere with the discretionary finding of extenuation, this Is a 
further reason why the trial court should deal with this matter with 
great care. As Holmes J A saiti In S v Letsolo "Every relevant 
consideration should receive the most scrupulous care and reasoned 
attention; and all the more so because the sentence Is unalterable on 
appeal, save on an Improper exercise of judicial discretion, that Is 
to say unless the sentence 16 vitiated by Irregularity or
■isdirectlon or Is disturbingly Inappropriate."
Two further points need to be commented upon. Firstly, It Is 
suggested that we should have some sort of provision which makes It 
mandatory for the Supreme Court to review any cases where the death 
penalty has been Imposed but no appeals have been lodged. In other 
words the Supreme Court should scrutinise every single capital case 
and not only those (although these will be the great majority)1 which 
come to them by way of appeal. Secondly, It Is submitted the capacity 
of the Supreme Court to Interfere with death sentences Imposed by 
trial courts should be expanded. Under the present system there have
been a number of cases where the Appeal court judges have made such
statements as "Had I been responsible for sentence In this case, I 
think I would have taken the view that In all the circumstances, a 
sentence other than death was justified but as there was no
misdirections and as It cannot be said that the sentence was
disturbingly Inappropriate I cannot Interfere with the trial judge's 
exercise of his discretion In this matter." ^  The rationale for
non-interference In the absence of a misdirection or disturbing
inappropriateness of the sentence, is that it Is the trial judge who 
is vested with the discretion In regard to sentence. The matter of 
extenuation, however, Is different from verdict. With verdict the 
trial judge Is In a far better position to decide this having heard 
all the witnesses and having formed Impressions about their
credibility and so on. With extenuation, on the other hand, the 
appeal judges are in as good a position as the trial court to decide
this matter as they have before them the record of the trial
proceedings which includes all facts relevant to extenuation together 
with the trial judge's reasons for his decision on this matter. The 
decision on extenuation is a matter of value judgment as to how the. 
extenuating and aggravating factors should be weighed up. Surely if 
these appeal judges decide that in their unanimous judgment they would 
not have imposed the death penalty in all the circumstances, the 
accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and the death penalty 
should be set aside even if the'Appeal judges can't go as far as to 
find that the sentence was disturbingly inappropriate. Admittedly if 
the Appeal Court had such a power, it would only be 'in the rare case 
that it would be applicable, as the Supreme Court has not been very 
reticent about finding Inappropriateness or manifest excessiveness 
where it has disagreed with the trial court's finding about the death 
penalty. The point is, however, . that the Supreme Court should be 
relieved of what is an unnecessary constraint to overturning the 
impositions of the death penalty in appropriate circumstances. Surely 
no-one should hang if the appeal court is of the opinion that it would 
not have imposed the death penalty even if the trial court judge has 
properly exercised his discretion. 12
11. 1970 (3) SA 476 (A) at 477.
12. For a statement of this nature see Timothy v S. Unreported 
A-178-77 for instance.
66 Z. L. Rev. Vol. 4 1986
B. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
The President's power to set aside a death sentence Imposed by the 
courts and to substitute some other sentence is contained in section 
67 of the Constitution. The relevant portions of this section are 
M67(l) The President may, subject to such lawful conditions as he may 
deism fit:
. (a) grant a pardon to any person concerned in or convicted of 
an offence against any law;
(b) substitute, a less severe punishment for that imposed by any 
sentence for such an offence."
6. INDIVIDUAL FACTORS WHICH MAY BE EXTENUATING
The factors dealt with below come up in various permutations in cases 
of murder. In one case only one factor may be present whereas in 
another a whole variety of these may . have entered into the picture. 
All the circumstances referred to by Hunt relate either to subjective 
influences affecting the functioning of the mind and thence conduct or 
external factors' influencing conduct which may serve to reduce the 
blameworthiness of the behaviour. These individual factors will now 
be considered before making some.more general observations about the 
common characteristics of cases of murder which have attracted 
penalties other than death.
Hunt 13 provides the following list of factors which have been 
considered as extenuating in the various cases:
Mental condition, other than mental condition warranting 
special verdict.
Provocation and other emotional disturbance.
Intoxication.
Legal intention only.
Partial exercise.
Belief in witchcraft.
No premeditation.
Compulsion.
Youthfulness.
Political, social or other motives which are not ignoble.- 
Minor degree of participation.
Repentance and endeavours to assist victim before crime 
completed.
Mercy killing (consent of victim). 1^
A. MENTAL CONDITION, OTHER THAN MENTAL CONDITION WARRANTING SPECIAL 
VERDICT
In the case of Nyathi v S 13 Beadle C J stated " It is true that 134*
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F. 
C.
H.
I .
J.
K.
L.
M.
13. op. cit pp. 381-386.
14. At the end of this section there is a compilation of Zimbabwean 
cases which give guidance on the application of these individual 
factors.
15 Unreported A-12-74 at p. 5
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judged by the standards of the ordinary decent man, the 
appellant is an abnormal man, but there are few criminals who 
commit cold blooded murders, and who are sentenced to death for 
these murders, who can be said to be normal persons if judged by 
the standard of normal behaviour which one expects from decent 
citizens. There is some element of abnormality abo^ ut all 
criminals who commit cold blooded brutal crimes of murder. The- 
question here is to decide when that abnormality reaches a stage 
which justifies a court in imposing a sentence less than death. 
It would be highly undesirable, in my view, to attempt to lay 
down any hard and fast rules which would indicate when such 
abnormality was sufficiently great and when it was not. Each 
case must be judged on its own merits. The judge must make a 
value judgment and decide whether the circumstances are such, 
when all ... the merits of the case are weighed up, as to 
justify the imposition of a sentence other than death.”
In our law the provisions relating to when the special verdict 
is to be rendered are very broad. It includes cases where . the accused 
is suffering from a temporary disorder or disability of the mind at 
the time of the crime such as to make him not .responsible at law for 
his actions. Given the breadth of these provisions, all serious 
permanent or temporary mental conditions which cause mental 
Irresponsibility at the time murders are committed are encompassed. 
However, as Beadle C J points out in the quotation above, even though 
a special verdict is not warranted, any mental condition or 
abnormality which may have influenced the behaviour of the accused at 
the time is a possible extenuating circumstance. The nature and 
extent of the.abnormality and the'effect upon the. accused's behaviour 
must be carefully considered in determining whether this factor is 
extenuating. From a policy standpoint it would Seem that where the 
accused's conduct was heavily influenced by some mental abnormality or 
diminished responsibility such as a delusional belief or mental 
retardation, (but not such an abnormality as to require the special 
verdict), extenuating circumstances should be found as this type of 
murder is less reprehensible than a murder committed by a' person with 
a normal mind. ^
B. PROVOCATION (AMD OTHER EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES)
Glanville Williams in his Textbook of Criminal Law at p.477 . cites the 
statistic that ”half of the intentional killings of adult males are in 
a rage’or a quarrel, and another 14 percent in jealousy or rage." A 
sampling of the Zimbabwean cases on'murder Similarly indicates that a 
high proportion of murders takes place in circumstances where the 
accused lose their tempers after receiving verbal provocation or after 
witnessing events which provoke them. Very frequently the persons 
losing their tempers have been drinking and the consumption of alcohol 
is a contributory factor to the violent behaviour. Alcohol lowers 
inhibitions so the intoxicated person may more easily lose his temper, 
over-react, to any provocation received and more readily .respond with 
extensive violence. We are all familiar with the drunken brawl 16*
16. See Feltoe (1971) "Sane Automatism: The Demise of a Defence"
(1) Rhodesian Law Journal 19, Feltoe (1979) "Dreaming,
day-dreaming and the defence of automatism" (1) Zimbabwe Law 
Journal 12. \
For a commentary on the South African cases see Hunt op. . clt. 
381. '
17.
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situation where the incident which sparks the violence may be of a 
trivial nature. Another common situation is the domestic quarrel 
where again the final sparking incident may be of an insignificant 
character. Yet another frequent cause of anger is suspicion that a 
girl friend or a spouse has been unfaithful.
These, matters halve to be carefully considered wflen it comes Ito 
the.stage of extenuation. That' they are being considered at that 
stage pre-supposes that the trial court has already rejected the 
defence of provocation or the combined defences of intoxication and 
provocation. This means that the court will already have found that 
the accused had not so lost his self-control in response to the 
provocation, received that he had not formed the requisite mens rea for 
murder (or if he.had also.been drinking, the combined effects upon the 
accused of the drink and the provocation were not such that he failed 
to form the intention to kill). It will also have been found under' 
the second rung of our test for provocation that the action of the 
accused was not partially excusable on the basis that the reasonable 
person would have reacted similarly in the self-same circumstances by 
intentionally killing. <
Thus by the stage of extenuation the court will already have 
ruled that the accused was guilty of murder as he had killed his 
victim with actual or legal intefition and the action taken was 
unreas.onabl.e in response to the. extent of provocation received. But 
now on the separate issue of moral blameworthiness "nothing which 
influenced [the accused's] mind or emotions and thus his conduct can 
be ruled out of consideration merely because it was unreasonable for 
him to. allow it to influence him..." 1® Therefore the court must 
carefully consider the effect which the provocation (or- the drink land 
provocation) has had upon the accused's mind and thereby on his
conduct. It may be that his mind was very little influenced, if at
all, by these factors and that he knew full well what he was doing 
when he set upon his victim. (The nature of the accused's conduct may 
be such that it shows that he was . little affected by the 
provocation). On the other hand, although he may just have been able 
to form legal intent to kill, he may have been seething with rage and 
may have not been able to stop himself from fatally assaulting his 
victim. One problem which arises with the latter type of case is that 
the precipitating factor may have been of a very minor nature. If
that is the case, should the courts rule that, despite the extreme
anger of the accused, no extenuating' circumstances exist because his 
action in relation to . the 'provocation received was totally
disproportionate and unreasonable? It is submitted that to adopt such 
an objective approach at the extenuation stage is not correct and is 
unfair to the accused. 19 His moral blameworthiness is surely less 189
18. Hunt op. cit. 379.
19. It is arguable that the application of what seemed to be an
objective test in one case was unfair. In Ndhlovu v S.
Unreported A-33-73 the court accepted that what drove the 
accused to carry out the murder was his obsessional belief that 
his father had killed- the accused's wife. s This belief, said the 
.court was not extenuating because it was "not based upon 
reasonable grounds and was wholly irrational in the .
circumstances" (because, for instance, police investigations 
found that there was no substance in the accused's suspicions).
i
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In a situation when he acted precipitously and impetuously because his
passions were inflamed even though the sparking incident may have__been
of a minor nature. Such a case is of a different character from the 
case of, say, the accused who deliberately and viciously attacks his 
enemy intending to cause his death, using the excuse of some slight 
provocation to launch his attack*
Hunt points out that emotional upset arising out of events 
spread over a long period of time and not strictly amounting to 
'provocation', may sometimes constitute extenuating circumstances.
As regards marital quarrels and quarrels between lovers, in the 
case of S v Karuze Beadle C J adopted a fairly hard-line approach to 
these situations. This is what he said:
"There are very few murders which are committed when emotions 
are aroused because of marital infidelity or suspected 
infidelity which are committed when the accused's mind is not, 
to some extent, unbalanced by what has upset him. If every case 
where an accused committed a crime because his mind w*s 
temporarily unbalanced by something which had disturbed him was 
regarded as a case where extenuating circumstances existed, 
there would be relatively few murders when it would not be 
possible to argue that extenuating circumstances existed. The. 
mere fact that a murder is not committed - if I may use the 
expression — in cold blood, does not mean that extenuating 
circumstances exist." 21
The Karuze case was an unusual one as the accused did not kill 
his wife whom he suspected of infidelity but instead a completely 
Innocent child. Where, however, the accused believes his wife or 
lover to have been unfaithful and a full scale quarrel erupts over 
this and, during this heated argument, the accused kills the woman 
having only legal intent to kill, it is submitted that a sympathetic 
approach should be adopted when it comes to extenuation. The sort of 
approach which, it is submitted, our courts should adopt is the one 
adopted by the South African Appellate Division in the case of S— v 
Meyer. This is summed up in the headnote as follows:
"In general, and in the absence of evidence of aggravation, the 
mental tension which leads to a murder committed in a situation 
where the act in question is usually the consequence of a 20*
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20. Op. cit. p. 382. See the case of S v Zuze. Unreported A-200-77 
where there had been a long history of discord leading up to the 
situation in which the step-son after verbal provocation killed 
his step-mother. See also the note on a recent South African 
case on emotional stress in (1985) 102 SALJ 240. In this note 
the author argues that this case was incorrect insofar as the 
case admitted a defence of 'emotional stress'. This was, 
however, a case of cumulative provocation and is the sort of 
case where extenuation might apply.
21. 1971 (1) RLR 169 at 171.
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quarrel between people who have a love relationship with each 
other, a quarrel out of which jealously and provocation often 
arises and which, because of the circumstances, can lead to 
sudden physical assault and even death, can be regarded as an 
extenuating circumstance,, and "indeed so extenuating that the 
death sentence ought not to be imposed. Even should there be 
premeditation in such a situation of conflict, extenuating 
circumstances could, depending on thfe facts, be foiind which 
would make a sentence other than the death sentence 
appropriate. Every case should naturally in every instance be 
treated on its own merits." 22
C. INTOXICATION
Again . if this factor is under consideration at the stage of
extenuation, the court will previously have found that the accused was 
not so drunk that he was unable to form the requisite intent to kill. 
In other words, he will previously have been found guilty of murder on 
the basis that when he caused the death he had done so with actual or 
legal intent to kill. What is., in issue therefore at the stage of
extenuation is the impact of the alcohol or drugs upon the accused’s 
mind and his behaviour when he perpetrated the murder„ The degree of 
intoxication thus needs to be carefully considered. The quantity of 
alcohol or drugs consumed needs to be looked at but the important
question is how the behaviour of the accused was affected by the 
quantity of intoxicant consumed. With some people it takes only a 
very small quantity of alcohol for them to become extremely drunk 
whereas with others who can hold their drink, even if they consume
considerable quantities of alcohol they do not become perceptibly 
drunk. Finally, therefore, the critical issue is how far was the
accused's conduct, the product of the intoxicant? The. answer may be 
not at all, only to a minimal extent, to a significant degree or to a 
very appreciable extent. Where the influence of the intoxicant in 
producing the conduct was considerable, this should normally serve to 
reduce the moral blameworthiness of the accused despite the fact that 
he got himself into the intoxicated state by voluntarily consuming the 
intoxicant. But, as to Hunt points out, it has been held to be a
misdirection in South Africa for the court to require proof that the
accused "was so intoxicated that he would not otherwise have committed 
the murder." If the liquor has to some -extent impaired or affected 
the mental faculties or judgment then the court must consider whether 
this constitutes extenuation. It is not a pre-requisite that the 
accused was drunk to an advanced extent. 23
The general policy approach in South Africa is summed up in this 
quotation from Holmes J A in the case of S v Ndhlovu. 24
"Intoxication is one of humanity's age-old frailties which may,
depending on the circumstances, reduce the moral blameworthiness
of a crime, and may even evoke a touch of compassion through 234
22. 1981 (3) SA 11 (A).
23. op. cit. p. 382.
24. 1965 (4) SA 692 at 695
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the perceptive understanding that man* seeking solace or 
pleasure in liquor, may easily over-indulge and thereby do 
things which sober he would not do. On the other hand 
intoxication may, again depending on the circumstances, 
aggravate the aspect of blameworthiness... as, for example, when 
a man deliberately fortifies himself with liquor to enable him 
insensitively to carry out a fell design...[The] basic [is that] 
the court has a discretion to be exercised judicially upon a 
consideration of the facts of each case, and in essence one is 
weighing the frailties of the individual with the evil of his 
deed.... "
D. LEGAL INTENTION ONLY
The fact that the murderer or the accomplice had only legal intention 
to kill may be an extenuating circumstances. In Mharadzo v S 25 
Beadle C J stated:
"I do not wish it to be inferred from this that, where the Court 
finds that only a constructive intent to kill is proved, the 
Court must necessarily find that is a circumstance of 
extenuation, but I do suggest that, where only a constructive 
intent to kill is proved, the Court will examine the other 
features of the case very carefully Indeed before rejecting a 
plea that the offence was committed in extenuating 
circumstances." (My emphasis)
It is submitted that the fact that there was no actual intent to 
kill but only legal intention is a factor which should normally 
extenuate. Granted there are cases where it looks as if there may 
well have been actual intent to kill but the accused is given the 
benefit of the doubt and a finding of murder with legal intent is 
made. However, usually the murderer with actual intent is far more 
morally blameworthy than the murderer with legal intent. If the aim 
and object of the accused is to kill, this is a different character of 
murder than the situation where the court finds as a matter of 
inference the accused must have and therefore did foresee the real 
possibility of death and continued to act reckless as to whether the 
death eventuated. 26
E. PARTIAL EXCUSE
Partial excuse is a somewhat misleading heading for the category of 
cases which Hunt has in mind here. The cases which he includes in 
this category are those where the accused have used excessive force in 
the course of self-defence, defence of property 27 or the 2567
25. 1966 (2) SA 702 (RA) at 703 C; 1966 RLR 240 quoted in Jacob v S 
1981 ZLR 1(A) pp G-7 See also Leonard v S A-128-70.
26. Whaley (1967) "Criminal in our Courts: Dolus Eventualis"
Responsa Meridiana 117 and Feltoe (1985) "States of Mind"
Zimbabwe Law Journal.
27. It is by no means certain that in our law we will follow the
South African case of S v Bradbury 1967 (1) SA 387 (A) and allow
as a defence to murder the defence that the accused killed to 
protect his property. The policy aspects will need to very 
carefully considered before a decision is made on this point.
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apprehension of a suspected . offender. These accused would have been 
able to raise successfully full defences to charges of murder if they 
had used a reasonable degree of force. If they have used totally 
disproportionate force, however, the defences raised will fail and the 
accused will be convicted of murder. The reason why they used such 
force may still nevertheless constitute extenuation in Zimbabwe as 
well as in South Africa. 28
F. BELIEF IN WITCHCRAFT
'If the accused killed in order to obtain parts of the victim's body 
for medicine, his belief in witchcraft would not be an extenuating 
circumstance. But in a case where the accused has killed a supposed 
witch to protect himself, his family or the community from the 
activities of the witch, the accused's avid belief in the evil, power 
of witchcraft may extenuate. This is particularly so if the accused 
believes that the witch has caused deaths by witchcraft practices and 
is threatening to cause further deaths by such practices. To
disregard a deeply held belief on the part of the accused on the basis 
that a such a belief is unreasonable is totally unfair. 29
G. COMPULSION
Although this has not yet been settled in our law, where an-accused 
kills or assists in the killing of another because he is under an 
immediate and inescapable threat of being killed unless he so murders 
the other, it would seem that our courts would allow compulsion as a 
defence to murder. (Even if this is not so, these would certainly be 
extenuating circumstances in this case, unless perhaps the accused had 
voluntarily joined a dangerous gang knowing that the gang engaged in 
violent activities and would threaten violence to ensure that its 
members carried out all instructions). 289
28. See Hunt. op. clt. p. 383. The most important case in our system 
is that of R v Detsera 1958 (1) SA 762 (FSC) which has been 
followed in Zimbabwean cases.
29. See L Aremu (1980) "Criminal Responsibility for Homicides in 
Nigeria and Supernatural Beliefs" 29 ICLQ~112 and Feltoe (1975) 
"Witch Murder and the Law" (1) Rhodesian Law Journal 40 In the 
case of Dube v S SC-33-82 Fieldsend C J said at p. 4 that in the 
unfortunately numerous cases where the accused's belief in 
witchcraft leads the accused to kill a person whom he believes 
is making the wicked deeds by witchcraft "is almost always 
regarded^ as extenuating circumstance." This case did not 
involve such a situation. Rather it was a case where the 
accused killed his father because of his obsessional belief that 
he was suffering personal misfortune as a direct result of his 
father's failure to conduct the required ceremonies which should 
have been conducted after his mother's death to put her spirit 
to rest. It is arguable that the trial court, despite its 
finding of actual intent to kill, was incorrect in not treating 
the strongly held belief that his misfortune stemmed from 
offence caused to ancestral spirits as a sufficient extenuating 
circumstance to justify a penalty other than death."
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But if the requirements for this defence ate not fully
Satisfied, (as is usually the case, there frequently being ways 
available to break away from the compelling influence by, say, going 
to the police) the fact that the accused has not voluntarily carried 
out the murder but did so because of threats of violence to himself or., 
to members of his family is prima facie extenuating because a murder 
carried out because of fear is less morally blameworthy than a murder 
carried out from motives of, say, revenge or greed. The court will,
however, have to examine factors such as the nature and extent of the 
threat, whether or not the accused could easily have freed himself 
from that threat and whether or not the accused is to blame for 
placing himself in a position where such threats would be likely to be 
levelled against him. 3° it. is submitted that we should give serious 
consideration to raising the age below which the courts cannot impose 
the death sentence to 18. In Slmbi & Anor v S Fieldsend CJ stated
at p.3 "In South Africa and indeed many other countries, the age 
[below which a person cannot be sentenced to death] is 18 which could 
with advantage be adopted in this Country.”)
H. ABSENCE OF PREMEDITATION
The moral blameworthiness of most persons who commit -non-premeditated 
murders is usually less than those who commit premeditated murders.
In some situations this may not be so. Thus, for instance, if a 
person without planning to do so, on the spur of the moment decided to 
kill an innocent person who had not provoked him in order to rob him, 
and he uses very brutal methods to do so, the absence of 
premeditation obviously in no way reduces his moral blameworthiness. 
Very frequently, however, the non-premeditated murder is carried out 
with only legal Intention in emotional circumstances. Typical of 
these types of cases are drunken brawls and various domestic 
quarrels. One writer has expressed the difference in seriousness 
between sudden impulsive killings and premeditated killings in these 
terms:
"It has been convincingly argued that when a killing is 
impulsive, concepts which emphasize rational processes - forming 
an intention or contemplating a risk - have little meaning.. The 
actor lost his self-control for whatever reason and the enquiry 
as his mens rea will amount more or less to the negation of 
duress, insanity and fundamental mistake coupled with some 
minimal notion of foresight of consequences'...
Planned and premeditated killing is different. Here the actor 
has written the script for the drama that ensues. Having 
reasoned his way to kill he presents a unique threat to his 
Intended victim's life and, more generally, to the rules 
necessary for the preservation of social order. This is not to 
say that in all cases his crime is more serious than that of one 
who kills impulsively; we can think of very heinous Instances of 
Impulsive killing and less heinous examples of planned and 301*
30. See Hunt op. cit, p. 384.
31. Onreported A-118-82.
/
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premeditated killing. It is however to recognize that it is 
different and in general more seriously wrong than other 
killings." 31
From a policy standpoint, it would seem that generally 
non-premedltated murders should be treated differently from 
premeditated murders. Deterrence cannot be a justification for a 
capital punishment in cases of sudden, impulsive, emotional killings. 
In such cases the accused acts without thinking about the consequences 
and* the threat, of the death penalty \cannot act as a deterrent. From 
the standpoint of deterrence the death penalty should be reserved for 
cases in which the imposition of this sentence may serve to discourage 
other potential murderers. 2^ From the standpoint of retribution the 
question needs to be asked whether the sudden, impulsive killing by a 
person who is most unlikely ever to. commit another murder should be 
treated on a per with the dangerous criminal who has used violence on 
a number of previous occasions against innocent people and has 
ultimately killed someone.
I. YOUTHFULMESS
In terms of s. 314 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act Cap. 59 
our courts cannot sentence- to death anyone under the age of sixteen. 
Any accused who is sixteen or over may be sentenced to death, even 
though under the Age of Majority Act 15 of 1982 a person does not 
attain ' majority until he reaches eighteen. However, with young 
murderers (particularly those who are close to the age of sixteen) the 
courts are obliged to give very careful consideration to whether 
youthfulness constitutes sufficient extenuation to justify the 
'imposition of a sentence other than death. The courts are obviously 
very loathe to pass the death sentence on young offenders as 
youthfulness is associated with "immaturity, a lack of experience of 
life, thoughtlessness and especially a mental condition of 
susceptibility to external influences, [particularly those emanating 
from] adult persons." Thus the policy of the courts is to give 
sympathetic consideration to the fact of youthfulness because to 
measure the youth's conduct using the yardstick of adult behaviour 
would be unfair. Considerations of humanity also apply as "no
ivilized State is anxious to send teenagers to the gallows" unless 
there are very exceptional circumstances. ^  In South Africa the 
courts have adopted the approach that prlma facie a youthful murderer 
is to be regarded as immature and on that ground extenuating 
circumstances will always exist unless it is found that the youth 
acted out of "inherent wickedness" in committing the murder. If the 
youth acted under the influence of an Older person or because of his 
youth and inexperience he is not acting from inherent wickedness, 
f\factors to be considered include motive, personality and mentality, 34
33. P. MacKinnon (1985)-"Two Views of Murder" 63 Canadian Bar Rev.
130.
32. See, for instance, J. Andenaes (1966) "The General Preventive 
Effects of Punishment" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
949 and Bedau The Death Penalty in America (3rd Ed.) 1982
OUP.Chapter 4. Strong doubts can be raised as to the deterrent
impact of capital punishment even in relation to premeditated 
killings.
34. The quotations in this paragraph are from the judgment of Rumpf
C J in S v Lehnberg and Anor 1975 (4) SA 553 (a) at 560.
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past history, nature of crime, manner of commission and any other 
relevant factors.
In Zimbabwe, however, in the case of S v X 35 Lewis J P 
expressed the opinion that the "inherent wickedness" test was not very 
helpful, was not easy to apply in every case and should not be applied
as a rule of thumb. Later he stated that, in finding that there was
no extenuation, despite the youthfulness of the accused, "the. trial 
court had not overlooked the general principle that a person of this 
age is, generally speaking assumed to be less mature than an adult" 
and the trial judge had examined to what extent it could be said that 
what he did was attributable to his immaturity. Subsequent to the 
reservations expressed by Lewis JP about the "inherent wickedness", 
the test has been applied by the Supreme Court in a number of cases 
and in Muchlnlka v S (No. 2) 36 Korsah JA cited these judgements and 
said that he saw no reason to depart from it. (In this case the
appellant was under 19 at the time he committed the murder. The 
Appeal Court found (at least impliedly) that the youth had committed
the murder not out of inherent wickedness, but because of personality
defects which he had acquired as a result. of being subjected to 
traumatic experiences at a tender age.)
It is submitted that this approach of treating youthfulness as 
Prlma facie extenuating Bhould especially be applied not only to 
youths between 16 and. 18. As Rumpff CJ said in the Lehnberg case,- 
speaking about persons of 18 and 19 years of age, "there are of course 
degrees of maturity where teenagers are concerned, but naturally no 
teenager has the maturity of an adult". 37
Only if the court is quite satisfied that the murder was in no 
way the product of youthful immaturity should it rule that the prlma 
facie assumption falls away and no extenuation exists on the grounds 
of youthfulness. In most cases, especially where the accused was 
close to 16, youthfulness is likely to have played some role in the 
causation of ’ the crime and thus extenuating on this ground will apply 
at least to some extent. It may be that it was only a weak 
extenuating circumstance if say the youth was reasonably mature for 
his age and somewhat worldly wise, but yet still not as experienced as 
an adult and the commission of the crime was still partially the 
product of this inexperience. Where such extenuating circumstances on 
the grounds of youthfulness exist, it is submitted that it should take 
extremely strong aggravating circumstances to justify any decision 
that the death penalty should still be imposed. Again from the 
general policy standpoint we should be extremely reluctant to hang 
youthful offenders.
J. POLITICAL. SOCIAL OR OTHER MOTIVES WHICH ARE NOT IGNOBLE
As regards social motives, Hunt cites a case where the accused 
believed that the person he killed was a witchdoctor who was a danger 3567
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35. A - 132 - 74.
36. 40. Unreported S-93-87.
37. op. clt. at 560.
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to the community and apparently this factor was taken into account in 
finding extenuating circumstances.
Regarding political motives, whatever may be the position in the 
political circumstances of South Africa where the oppressed majority 
are fighting to overthrow the apartheid regime, it would seem that in 
Zimbabwe the fact that the murder was done with a political objective 
will not be extenuating but may indeed be aggravating. Thus in the 
case of Moyo v S, ^9 for instance, it was stated that the killing of 
political opponents does not render the crime any less blameworthy.
K. MINOR DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
The accomplice is convicted of murder on the basis that he 
participated or assisted in a murder knowing that' the principal 
offender would kill or at least foreseeing the possibility that the 
principal might kill. If the accomplice was only a very minor 
participant in the enterprise this may be an extenuating 
circumstance. The nature of the circumstances need, however, to be 
carefully examined. If, for instance, the accomplice plays a minor 
role in an armed robbery and "he knew full well before the robbery 
commenced that his fellow criminals were armed with deadly weapons and 
•had every intention of using them to kill, the minor extent of 
participation might not necessarily be extenuating. Where, however, 
the accomplice was convicted on the basis of legal intention in that 
’ he foresaw death as a possible and not probable outcome of the 
enterprise, minor participation should normally be extenuating.
In the case of Mblrlnyu v S ^  Beadle C J had this to say about 
the significance of the fact that the appellant was a soclus 
crlmlnis:
"The fact that an accused is a soclus and not a principal 
offender is always an important factor to be taken into account 
in assessing his moral blameworthiness, and the principal factor 
to be taken into account here is the extent to which the socius 
makes common . cause with the principal offender, as there is a 
very wide range of moral blameworthiness in cases of this sort. 
The position of the soclus might be that he played a very 
unimportant part in the actual commission of the crime but was 
nonetheless a socius. In such a case the moral blameworthiness 
of the soclus would be very much less than that of the principal 
offender. In another case the part he played in the offence
might be so great as to identify him completely with the 
principal offender, in which case his moral blameworthiness 
could be considered to be as great as that of the principal 
offender." 389*
38. Op. clt. p. 386..
39. Unreported A-71-81.
AO Unreported A-149-73
L. REPENTANCE AMD ENDEAVOURS TO ASSIST VICTIM BEFORE CRIME COMPLETED
This may be extenuating but probably ohly if combined with other
factors. ^
M. MERCY KILLING (CONSENT OP VICTIM)
If an accused kills a person who is terminally ill or is suffering
from an incurable . disease, and who has pleaded for the accused to end
his pain by terminating his life, this has always been treated by our 
courts as extenuating.
To the category listed by Hunt, I would like to add some further 
categories.
N. KILLING BY A MOTHER OP HER NEWLY BORN CHILD
Where a mother has killed her child soon after it has been born, even 
though there may not have been a post-natal mental disturbance such as 
to attract a special verdict, nonetheless any lesser mental
perturbation influencing the conduct will be extenuating. So too 
other factors in this situation will also extenuate, such as the fact 
that the accused was a young uhwed mother who has been abandoned by 
the man who made"her pregnant or the accused is married with a large 
family and is living in circumstances of destitution and the support 
of an additional child will be an unbearable extra burden.
O. WITHDRAWAL FROM ENTERPRISE BEFORE MURDER CARRIED OUT, BUT NOT 
DISSOCIATION SUCH AS TO EXEMPT FROM LEGAL LIABILITY
This situation is dealt with in a recent Supreme Court case Ndebu,and 
Anor v S. ^2 In that case the accomplice had gone with another to 
rob a house. To the knowledge of the accomplice his fellow criminal 
was carrying, a gun. The accomplice had fled from the house when a 
female inhabitant had screamed and the accomplice was not physically 
present when the principal offender fired the fatal shot. On all the 
facts, the Appeal Court found that the accomplice was nonetheless 
guilty of murder, but it ruled that, as he had played a subsidiary 
role and as he had abandoned the common purpose Just before the fatal 
shot was fired, there were extenuating circumstances.
P. ABSENCE OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
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This seems to have been treated as a factor to be considered in 
respect of extenuation. ^  C
7. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE MANNER OF THE KILLING
Evidence relating to the manner of the killing (e.g. things like the 
extent of planning, degree of brutality of the killing, the number of 
blows struck and so on) may be relevant to the matter of extenuation 412
41. See Hunt op. clt. p. 386.
42. Unreported SC-72-85.
. See, for instance, Zuze v S A-200-77.43
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in so far. as this evidence . tnay provide either evidence tending to 
substantiate or to contradict the alleged extenuating 
circumstances.44 A few examples wiil serve to illustrate this
point. If the accused alleged that he was extremely drunk at the time 
of the killing, this may be disapproved by evidence of careful and 
methodical planning and execution. Or if the accused alleged that he 
completely lost his self-control as a result of provocation, again 
evidence of a seemingly rational and methodical course of conduct 
before and during the murder would tend to disprove the allegation of 
loss of self control. Oh the other hand, a murderous attack of a wild 
and random nature may be consistent with and tend to verify alleged 
loss of self control, however, the court has already found that there 
were ■ extenuating circumstances, the court cannot then proceed to find 
that because of the brutal and callous nature of the killing these 
extenuating circumstances were somehow neutralised or overriden and, 
on this basis, then proceed to impose the death penalty. That this is 
an entirely wrong approach was made quite clear by the Supreme Court 
in Mateketa v S. 45 Chaluwa v S 46 Mutsunge 6 Anor vs S 47 «nd 
Muchimika v S. 48 Following the approach adopted by the South 
African Appellate Division, 49 the Supreme Court ruled that the fact 
that the killing was of a callous and brutal nature cannot be used in 
order to justify-a conclusion that the death penalty was still to be 
imposed despite the presence of extenuating circumstances.
AGGRAVATING FEATURES
A. PRE-MEDITATION
Generally ^re-meditated murders are more heinous than unplanned, spur 
of the moment killings. If the accused decides in advance that he 
will kill his victim, plans how he will do this and then executes this 
plan, in the absence of strong extenuation, this may well tip the 
scales in favour of the death penalty.
B. MURDERS BY ARMED GANGS ENCAGED IN TREASONABLE OR "DISSIDENT” 
ACTIVITIES
Clearly persons who kill whilst implementing a plan to overthrow the 
lawful government will almost certainly attract the death penalty. So 
too with an individual who kills in furtherance of political 
objectives by, say, planting a bomb in a public place.
Various armed gangs are presently operating in Zimbabwe, the 
members of ■ which are seeking to de-stabilise the country and to cause
44. See Mutsunge & Anor
judgement.
45. Unreported S-99-85.
46. Unreported S-75-55.
47. Unreported S-36-87.
48. Unreported S-93-87.
49. S v Ndwalane 1985
such as Supetrus 1969 (4) SA 85 (A).
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unrest. The lawful forces are carrying out operations to eliminate 
these elements. From time to time members of the Security Forces are 
killed during battles with these armed dissidents. These dissidents 
also kill civilians in order to induce the civilian population not to 
support the forces of the lawful government of Zimbabwe. The actual 
perpetrators of these murders are almost certain to receive the death 
penalty as it is highly unlikely that any extenuating circumstances 
will be present. Accomplices of such murders are also likely to 
attract the death penalty unless the degree pf participation was very 
minor or other extenuating circumstances were present, such as a high 
degree of compulsion.
C. MURDERS DURING BOBBERIES AND HOUSEBREAKINGS
Murders during the course of robberies and housebreakings have often 
In the past attracted the death penalty, the courts stressing the need 
to protect the public against these sorts of fatal crimes. The 
particular factors surrounding the death.must, however, be carefully 
considered in order to'decide whether the death penalty is justified. 
In detailing some of the factors which are relevant, a distinction can 
be drawn between the principal offender and the accomplice.
1. THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR OF THE MURDER
In the absence of extremely strong extenuating circumstances the 
person who kills someone during the course of the robbery or . a 
housebreaking will almost certainly receive the death penalty. This 
is particularly so where this person has carried firearms or other 
dangerous weapons to the scene of the crime to use in the event of 
resistance or disturbance by the victim ot guards. If, however, the 
killer was not armed and, for instance, he killed a victim who had 
disturbed him during the course of what was planned to be a 
non-violenf theft by using, say, his fists and feet and he was found 
to have had only legal intent to kill, it is possible that the death 
penalty might not be imposed. ^0
ii. THE ACCOMPLICE
If the accomplice accompanies a person whom he knows to be armed and 
whom he knows is likely to use this weapon with fatal effect during 
the housebreaking or robbery, the blameworthiness of the accomplice is 
of a high order. As McNally J A said in the case of Ndebu and Anor v S
"The mere fact that one of a number of wrongdoers carries a 
weapon does not necessarily mean, when the wrongdoing leads to 
murder, that he alone will face the death penalty... [It is] a 
valid point ... that, although the. unarmed man's moral 
blameworthiness may be lower than that of his armed colleague, 
it may still be so high that the death penalty is appropriate."
If, however, the killer killed not with a weapon but with blows 
from fists and feet and the accomplice, who had played only a minor 
role in the criminal enterprise such as standing look-out, was found 
to have only legal intent, then the death penalty would not usually be 
appropriate. 50
50. But in the case of Muchenje v S S-81-85 an appeal against the 
death penalty was dismissed where a housebreaker had brutally 
assaulted an elderly inhabitant after disarming him-, the accused 
had legal and not actual intent to kill.
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D. MURDERS DURING RAPES
Such murders are very likely to attract the death penalty, the court! 
being concerned - to protect women from sexual attacks. .The worsl 
species of such murders is clearly where the rapist decides either ii 
advance of or after, the rape to kill the victim so that she cannol 
identify him to the police. Far more frequently the killing occurs ai 
a result of. violence used by the rapist to overcome resistance froi 
the victim. Here the killing may be done only with legal intent, bul 
the fact that the killing occurred consequent upon a rape attack ma; 
still move the court to impose the death sentence.
E. DEGREE OF BRUTALITY OF MURDER -
Where the accused deliberately tortures his victim for some time 
before finally killing him this is an aggravating feature. However, 
as stated previously, where there are extenuating circumstances the 
court cannot use the brutality of the murder as a ground to Justify 
imposing the death penalty despite the presence of extenuating 
circumstances.
F. OTHER AGGRAVATING FACTORS
There may be aggravating factors other than those mentioned. It may 
be an aggravating factor that the accused killed his mother, or. his 
father or that the person killed was a policeman who was carrying
out his duties at the time he was killed, 52
Apparently the fact that the accused had previous convictions is 
not to be treated as having, much weight as an aggravating factor 
unless perhaps the criminal record is especially bad, 53
8. FACTS WHICH COURTS MAY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN CONSIDERING 
EXTENUATION
Facts to be taken into account include proven facts, upon which the 
conviction is based and such other facts as may be proven when the 
enquiry into extenuation is undertaken provided that the latter facts 
"may only amplify or temper the findings on the merits but may not 
alter them." As regards the findings on the merits, . these will 
include the accused's own version of the events . even if that version 
was improbable but the court relied upon it when convicting him 
because the court decided it might reasonably and possibly be true* 54 5123*
51. See S v Petrus 1969.(4) SA 85 (A) at 90.
52. See Muhlaba v S A-76-73.
53. There seems to be no Zimbabwean case on this matter. This,
however, is the approach adopted in the South African case of S 
v Felix and Anor 1980 (4) SA 604 (A) at 612.
. See Chaluwa v S. Unreported S-75-85 at p. 7-8 and the South
. African cases cited in this portion of the judgment.
54
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9. PI8T1HCPISH1HC MURDERS WHICH SHOULD ATTRACT THE DEATH PENALTY 
FROM THOSE WHICH SHOULD HOT
As we have seen In cases of murder the Legislature has afforded the 
courts a- discretion when and when not to Impose the death penalty. It 
his done this by stipulating that Where the court finds that 
extenuating circumstances exist It can Impose a sentence other than 
death. Underlying this provision must . be the Idea that, although 
murder Is by Its very nature a heinous crime, some murders are worse 
than others and It Is the worst types of murder Which should attract 
the death penalty, whereas In other cases a sentence other than death 
may be appropriate. . The problem comes In trying to Identify the
characteristics of those murders which make some murders so bad as to 
justify the Imposition of the ultimate penalty and to mark these off 
from other types of murder which are less serious and which do not 
demand the passing of the death sentence.
The circumstances leading to and surrounding the commission of 
different murders are widely varied. For this reason It has not been 
possible to draw a clear dividing line between those murders which 
merit death and those that do not. Recognition la Impliedly given to 
this reality by the Legislature; the underlying reason why the courts 
have been afforded broad discretionary powers to decide whether 
extenuating circumstances exist (which circumstances are not defined 
in the legislative provision) Is that, presumably, the Legislature 
appreciated that each case had to be considered on Its own Individual 
facts and no hard and fast rules could be established. Although hard 
and fast rules governing the Imposition of the death penalty cannot be 
formulated, this does not mean- that we should refrain from trying to 
identify the sorts of characteristics which lead the courts either to 
impose or not to Impose the ultimate sentence. Far from it, we should 
be seeking to develop a rational and consistent policy as to . when the 
death penalty Is warranted and wheh It is not and that policy can only 
be decided upon if we seek to Isolate the sorts of features which the 
courts see as critical In determining In this matter. The questions 
which need to be asked are:
1. In general terms, In what sorts of Situations of murder Is. the 
death penalty the appropriate penalty and In what sorts of 
situations of murder Is a lesser penalty warranted?
2. In cases where the death penalty is imposed Is there a 
compelling social justification and rationale for Imposing this 
ultimate penalty?
3. How consistently Is the decision to impose the death penalty 
applied by the different Judges?
The third question Is one which has received much attention in other 
countries. In America the Supreme Court In a number of constitutional 
cases on capital punishment highlighted the erratic. Inconsistent and 
discriminatory nature of the administration of the death penalty when 
the power decide on its Imposition are broad, vague, and discretionary 
powers to decide whether or not the death penalty should be Imposed. 
States which have re- Introduced the death penalty after these 5
55. Thus, for Instance, in the case of LQvemore v S. Unreported 
A-110-71 Beadle C J remarked “It was a" bad killing but not 
anything like as bad as many cases of murder that come before 
this court.”
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decisions have sought to compose statutes which structure th. 
discretion so as to avoid the charge of arbitrariness by for instance 
specifying a limited number' of aggravating circumstances at least one 
of which must - be present before the death sentence can be imposed and 
itemising mitigating circumstances which, if present, can permit the 
court to impose lesser sentences than death even if there are 
aggravating circumstances. 56
In Zimbabwe the discretionary power to Impose or not to impose the 
death penalty is very wide and vague. As a result of different judges 
having differing views on the death senetence, some strongly favouring 
it, others actively disliking it, being dubious about its moral 
justifiability and deterrent effectiveness, and feeling that in 
exercising this broad discretionary power almost inevitably there must 
be inconsistencies in the way in which the decision to impose the 
death penalty is applied. Indirect evidence of possible inconsistency 
derives from the fact that not infrequently trial judges decide to 
impose the death sentence and-the Supreme Court decides otherwise on 
appeal.
There is the additional factor that moral blameworthiness is usually 
assessed on a case by case basis rather than on a comparative basis, 
although the courts refer to previous cases dealing with the weight to 
be attached to individual factors which may extenuate. Comparisons 
between different cases are, of course, exceedingly difficult in that 
the mix of factors vary from case to case and it is a matter of value 
judgment whether one case where death was imposed was "worse” or 
"better" than one where it was not.-
Despite these difficulties of comparison, again in general terms, we 
need to - be satisfied that we are applying the death penalty to the 
sorts of case6 where .there is no doubt that it is the appropriate 
penalty. The premiss should be that it is the worst types of murder 
which merit the imposition of the death penalty and that less heinous 
murders can be dealt with properly with lesser penalties than death. 
The task of the judges is to apply this approach to the individual 
cases which come before them. It is submitted that it is more likely 
that this policy would be consistently applied if the decision-making 
process in all capital murder cases was more carefully structured. 
One way to structure it would be to adopt the American approach of 
seeking to identify all the aggravating factors, one or more of which 
mu6t be present before the death penalty can be imposed, and then to 
list the mitigating features which if present will allow the courts a 
discretion to Impose a sentence other than death.- This approach is 
strongly advocated by Professor Seidman but it did not find favour 
with the Chief Justice's Advisory Committee, when they were considering 
the issue of capital punishment.
This writer is of the opinion that we should strongly consider the 
devising of a scheme along the American lines. Although it may be a 
difficult task to draw a comprehensive list of aggravating factors
56. See Bedau op. clt and Seidman's submissions to the Chief 
Justice's Advisory Committee when they Were considering the 
matter of capital punishment.
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and mitigating factors, It Is by no means an Impossible task. In 
America it seems „ to have been achieved on a reasonably satisfactory 
basis In States which have recently sought to re-introduce the death 
penalty. In Zimbabwe over a number of years various mitigatory and 
aggravating factors have been recognised by the courts. These could 
serve as a basis for a comprehensive list and the American provision 
could also be looked at as a possible source. The great advantage of 
the American approach la that It carefully structures the death 
penalty decision ahd It substantially guards again Inconsistencies and 
arbitrariness in this initial field. It could also be argued that It 
is more logical to consider first aggravating features and then to 
look at mitigatory factors. The aggravating factors are the ones 
which place the murder in a special category of seriousness; If one or 
more of these are present then the murder is no longer an "ordinary 
murder" but is rather an especially grave murder. These aggravating 
factors thus provide the courts with a device for identifying "grave 
murders". Once the. case falls into this category, the death penalty 
is appropriate unless certain mitigatory features are present which 
are assessed as being sufficiently strong to outweigh the gravity of 
the murder which was committed in these circumstances of aggravation.
It seems, however, that this proposal, having already been 
rejected, will not now be accepted. It is suggested, therefore, that 
in the interests of the most thorough treatment of the issue of 
extenuation (given the fact that the present handling of this issue by 
trial courts is not always as painstaking as it might be), the courts 
should at least have some sort of check list of recognised extenuating 
and aggravating factors which they should be obliged to use to ensure 
that they cover all possible relevant factors when the death penalty 
decision is being taken.
10. COHCLPSIOH
It is earnestly hoped that In the near future we will move to abolish 
completely the death penalty regime. If, however, we are going to 
hang some of our murderers we should hang only the very worst ones. 
In the exercise of their discretionary capacity to impose the death 
penalty, the . courts should seek to Identify the most heinous forms of 
murder and restrict the application of the death penalty to these 
cases. They should not duck this responsibility of trying to 
formulate coherent, rational and consistent policies on - the 
administration of the death penalty by asserting that each case of 
murder hinges on its own facts and the facts may vary widely from case 
to case.
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APPENDIX: USEFUL ZIMBABWEAN CASES OH INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
(This is a list of. cases, where the courts have commented upon the
application of the particular factor Under which the case is.listed).
MENTAL CONDITION
1. Nyatl A-12-74 (General observations).
2. Johannes A-100-75 (No motive but psychiattist convinced accused 
simulating mental abnormality).
3. Bontanquol and Anor S-171-82; (1st appellant mentally backward 
and emotionally unstable but this did not affect his actions in 
premeditated robbery and murder).
4. . Joseph S-82-85 (Court ordered examination of accused to
ascertain whether some diminished sense of responsibility or 
other mental condition reducing blameworthiness).
5. . Taanorwa S-43-87 (need to distinguish between mental disorder
justifying special verdict and mental or emotional state 
amounting to extenuating circumstance).
6. Muchlmlka S-93-87 (youth brutalised and personality adversely 
affected by war experiences and imprisonment at tender age- 
extenuation despite cold-blooded killing).
PROVOCATION AND OTHER EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
1. Sam A-232-69 (Provocation and intoxication but killing wrong 
man).
2. Leonard A-128-70 (Insufficient provocation).
3. Karuzl 1971 (1) RLR 169 (Killing Innocent child. -. belief that 
wife unfaithful - death penalty appropriate).
4. Ndhlovu A-33-73 (Obsessional belief not based on reasonable 
grounds).
5. Zuze A-200-77 (Cumulative provocation).
6. Chladzwa A-225-77 (Quarrel - intoxication and provocation).
7. Tarlsayl S-107-83 (Provocation mild - reaction totally, out of
proportion).
8. Nyonl S-61-87. (grievance at having been Jilted by girlfrlend-not 
necessarily extenuating).
INTOXICATION
1. Timothy A-178-71 (Accused consumed considerable quantities of
beer - probably would not have raped and killed if sober but
death penalty still imposed).
2. Masaraure A-189-75 (Drunkeness feature that cannot be carried
too far - very drunk if sober would not have killed - but death 
sentence still appropriate).
3. Chladzwa A-225-77 (Quarrel - intoxication and provocation)
4. Chundu S-14-84 (Smoking of dagga not mitigatory as nothing to
suggest senses affected).
5. Chamunorwa S-137-86 (Accused must prove on balance of
probabilities that was affected by alcohol).
LEGAL INTENTION ONLY
1. Leonard A-128-70 (Court must examine very carefully facts if 
only legal Intent).
2. Jacob 1981 ZLR 1 (A) (Legal Intent factor on credit side but to 
be weighed with the other factors - where extenuating).
3. Chundu S-14-84 (Legal intent but far outweighed by aggravating
factors).
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1 4. Dube SC-39-85 (Killing of woman by soldier - legal Intent but 
no extenuation).
PARTIAL EXCUSE
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1. Detsera 1958 (1) SA 762 (FSC) (Excessive self-defence).
2. Mateketa S-99-85 (Thought husband about to kill her - good 
grounds for belief. - but gruesome and callous murder).
BELIEF IN WITCHCRAFT
1. Hhlanga A-27-81 (Circumstances in which mitigatory).
2. Chlradza A-44-81 (To obtain human tissue for good luck charm).
3. Goredema A-63-81.
4. Ngubane 1980 (2) SA 741 (A).
HO PREMEDITATION
1. Lovemore A-110-71 (Drunken brawl between young men).
2. Zuze A-200-70 (Acting on spur of moment without pausing to
consider).
COMPULSION
1. Mucherechedzo S-176-81.
2. Mapfumo S-65-83.
TOGTHFPLNESS
1. Lovemore A-110-71 (17 year old - Drunken brawl between young
men).
Zvlkaramba A-310-77 (19 year old - but no extenuation as 
cold-blooded murder of helpless elderly man).
3. Slmbl and Anor S-118-82 (Age Important factor).
4* Nzlma and Anor S-55-84 (Youthful dissidents - gun battle with
police).
Slgareta and Anor S-65—84 (Young men but planned and
cold-blooded plot to murder and rob elderly defenceless persons 
- aggravation outweighed mitigation).
6* Muchlmlka (1) S-121-85 (Commentary on age factor as extenuation).
7* Muchimlka (2) S—93—87 (Under 19— brutalised at tender age. by war- 
and imprisonment - extenuation despite cold blooded klllong).
x) POLITICAL MOTIVE
1. Moyo A-71-81 (Killing of political opponents does not make:
killing less blameworthy).
xi) MINOR DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
1. Mblrlnyu A-149-73 (Fact soclue Important factor to be taken 
Into account).
Kii) REPENTANCE AND ENDEAVOUR TO ASSIST AFTER CRIME
l. Mblrlnyu A-149-73 (Co-operation after murder - not hard and
fast rule that not extenuating).
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xiii) MERCY KILLILNG
1. Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532 (A) (Doctor killing dying father).
2. De Bellocqu (reported In 1975 (3) SA 538) (Woman killing her 
baby suffering from grave disease).
3. Mayer 1985 (4) SA 332 (HC) (Suicide pact between elderl)
couple who believed that wouldn't be able to cope financially - 
accused killing wife but only blinded himself when tried to to 
take own life).
xlv) BABY KILLIHC
1. Rufaro 1975 (1) RLR 97 (A).
Msindo A-172-75.
Paterson A-109-79 (Fractured skull with four blows).
4. Phlrl S-77-84 (Unsophisticated 20 year-old girl In difficult
family circumstances and responsibilities-killing new-borr 
Illegitimate child-effective 18 months Imprisonment 
appropriate-seriousness of offence-need for deterrence).
5. Ndawana S-115-84 (Long premeditated decision to murder Infant
and dispose secretly of Its body-6 years Imprisonment not 
exesslve).
6. Jokasl S-102-86 (Factors to be considered In assessing
sentence-appropriate range of sentence for this crime).
7. Tawanda S-l04-86 (27 year-old widow with 5 children killing
new-born baby because unable to support it and afraid of hei
father's reaction to birth - 4 years imprisonment of which J
suspended appropriate).
8. Chawasema S-l9-87 (Deliberate killing of newly born child bj
prostitute living in desperately poor circUmstances-4 year: 
imprisonment).
9. Shonhlwa S-78-87 (21year old-raped by father ol
child-premeditated killing of child - 4 years imprisonment
appropriate).
xv) WITHDRAWAL ACCOMPLICE BEFORE MURDER
1. Ndebu and Anor S-72-85 (Accomplice running away before killing).
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
1) PRE-MEDITATION
1. Simon A-69-73 (Element of deliberation in killing outweighec 
intoxication and belief that deceased had beaten mother).
2. Amblrayl A-121-76 (Brutal deliberate and premeditated murdet 
even though lnsensed as thought that deceased had assisted ii 
elopment of daughter).
3. Slgareta and Anor S-GS-84 (Deliberately planned am
cold-blooded plot to murder and rob two elderly defencelesi 
people for gain).
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ii) ARMED GANGS ENCAGED IS TREASON OK DISS1DEHT ACTIVITY
1. Hzlma and Anor S-55-84 (Youthful dissidents)*
111) MPRDE&S PORING ROBBERIES AMP HOUSEBREAKINGS
1. Balton A-l98-70 (Robbery).
1. Moyo A-16-81.
3. Mudzlmu S-95-82 (Robbery - killing taxi driver legal Intent 
but aggravating circumstances outweighed).
4. Slbanda S-32-82 (Killing during robbery - no extenuating).
5. Charamba S-146-82 (Brutal murder for gain In courses of 
housebreaking).
5. Moyo S-186-82 (Payroll robbery - accused soclus but planner of 
crime - murder with legal Intent - no extenuation).
7. Ndhlovu S-34-85 (In absence of weighty extenuating 
circumstances murdets committed In course of robberies will 
attract death penalty).
3. Muchenje S-81-85 (Robbery - murder of old man in house - legal 
Intent but aggravating features outweighed).
Lv) MURDERS DURING RAPES
L. Maplro A-106-71 (Raping and brutal murdering - somewhat under 
Influence of drink and possibly some provocation but no 
extenuation).
/) MANNER OF KILLING
Irrelevant as regards extenuation except to extent that may throw
loubt on facts alleged in support of extenuating circumstances
L .  Mateketa S-99-85.
!. Chaluwa S-75-85.
). Mutsunge and Anor S-36-87.
t. Muchimika S-93-87.
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